

VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHJA #1187 1170935
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 270935Z APR 07
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4508
INFO RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS IMMEDIATE 0030
RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE IMMEDIATE 0024
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE 0700
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID IMMEDIATE 0136
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT IMMEDIATE 0063
RUEHSQ/AMEMBASSY SKOPJE IMMEDIATE 0012
RUEHTI/AMEMBASSY TIRANA IMMEDIATE 0013
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON IMMEDIATE 1477
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE IMMEDIATE 0015
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 0049
RHHJJPI/USPACOM HONOLULU HI IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L JAKARTA 001187

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EAP/MTS, EUR/SCE, IO/PSC (THOMAS), NEA/MAG (EWING)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/27/2017

TAGS: PREL PGOV UNSC UNMIK RU VI MO WI ID

SUBJECT: UNSC: DISCUSSION WITH INDONESIA ON MINURSO, KOSOVO

REF: STATE 56431 (UNSC MINURSO MANDATE RENEWAL)

Classified By: Marc L. Desjardins. Reason: 1.4 (b, d)

¶1. (C) Summary. On April 27, an Indonesian Department Foreign Affairs official indicated that the GOI was undecided about whether to support the Friends of the Western Sahara draft resolution on the MINURSO mandate (reftel), but said that as a matter of principle it was unlikely to do so in the absence of indications that the draft was acceptable to all parties in the dispute. The official added that he had just received a demarche from the Russians on Kosovo independence.

The Russians' position on Kosovo, he said, was still "diametrically opposed" to that of the U.S. and the EU. End summary.

Western Sahara: Indonesia Ambivalent

¶2. (C) On April 27, we met with Hery Saripudin of the Indonesian Department of Foreign Affairs' Directorate of International Security to urge that the GOI accept without changes the Friends of the Western Sahara's draft UNSCR on renewing MINURSO's mandate (reftel). Saripudin said that the GOI fundamentally regarded the issue as a decolonization problem, since it considered the Western Sahara to be an "occupied territory." Reciting the history of the issue, he deplored the fact that arrangements for a plebiscite under the two Baker Plans had broken down over questions of modalities. Saripudin said that he had met with the Moroccan Ambassador the day before, who had conveyed the impression that any plebiscite leading to independence was now off the table.

¶3. (C) Saripudin said that the GOI would support the draft UNSCR only if it were persuaded that it was acceptable to the Polisario as well as to Morocco. Otherwise, the GOI would not agree to imposing the UNSCR out of a sense of undue urgency. He said that the GOI was proceeding very carefully, since it had realized that its UNSC votes had domestic political ramifications. He added, however, that developments were breaking very rapidly in New York and that he might not be informed of the latest. He thanked us for our presentation and said he would convey our position

together with the draft Friends UNSCR (which he said he had not yet seen) to the Indonesian Mission to the UN.

Kosovo: Russians Intransigent

¶4. (C) On Kosovo, Saripudin said he had just received a demarche from the Russian DCM, Kyrill Barsky. Barsky, he said, had provided a readout of Foreign Minister Lavrov's April 19 visit to Belgrade. The Russians reaffirmed their strong opposition to Kosovo independence and had pressed the GOI to join them, according to Saripudin. The Russians regard UNSCR 1244 (1999) as the basis for the status of Kosovo and oppose any effort to change this. Saripudin observed dryly that Russia's position was "diametrically opposed" to that of the United States and European Union on this question.

Comment

¶5. (C) Post believes that the GOI will not commit to supporting managed independence for Kosovo unless it gets clear signals that Russia and China do not oppose it. As with the Iranian resolution, generation of a P-5 consensus remains key to pushing the GOI to "yes." End comment.

HEFFERN